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Abstract
An embedding of many-valued logics based on SIXTEEN in classical
higher-order logic is presented. SIXTEEN generalizes the four-valued
set of truth degrees of Dunn/Belnap’s system to a lattice of sixteen truth
degrees with multiple distinct ordering relations between them. The the-
oretical motivation is to demonstrate that many-valued logics, like other
non-classical logics, can be elegantly modeled (and even combined) as frag-
ments of classical higher-order logic. Equally relevant are the pragmatic
aspects of the presented approach: interactive and automated reasoning
in many-valued logics, which have broad applications in computer sci-
ence, artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy and mathematics, be-
come readily enabled with state of the art reasoning tools for classical
higher-order logic.
Keywords. many-valued logic; non-classical logic; higher-order logic; au-
tomated theorem proving; semantic embedding; automation; meta-logical
reasoning
1 Introduction
Classical logics are based on the bivalence principle, that is, the set of truth-
values V has cardinality |V | = 2, usually with V = {T,F} where T and F stand
for truth and falsity, respectively. Many-valued logics (MVL) generalize this
requirement and allow V to be a more or less arbitrary set of truth-values, often
referred to as truth-degrees. Popular examples of many-valued logics are fuzzy
logics [39, 27] with an uncountable set of truth-degrees, Go¨del logics [25, 22]
and  Lukasiewicz logics [29] with denumerable sets of truth-degrees, and, from
the class of finitely-many-valued logics, Dunn/Belnap’s four-valued logic [5, 6].
The latter system, although originating from research on relevance logics,
has been of strong interest to computer scientists as a formal foundation of
information systems and knowledge bases. Here, the set of truth-degrees is
given by the power set of {T,F}, i.e. V = {N,T,F,B}, where N denotes the
empty set ∅ (mnemonic for None), B the set {T,F} (for Both), and T and F
denote the singleton sets containing the respective classical truth-value.
This article presents an approach for automating MVL based on a sixteen-
valued lattice, denoted SIXTEEN [33]. This system has been developed by
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Shramko and Wansing as a generalization of the mentioned Dunn/Belnap four-
valued system to knowledge bases in computer networks [32] and was subse-
quently further investigated in various contexts (e.g. [31, 33]). In SIXTEEN,
the truth-degrees are given by the power set of Dunn/Belnap’s truth values, i.e.
V = 2{N,T,F,B}. This generalization is essentially motivated by the observa-
tion that a four-valued system cannot express certain phenomena that arise in
knowledge bases in computer networks. Further applications in linguistics and
philosophy are discussed in the monograph by Shramko and Wansing [33], to
which we refer for a thorough investigation.
While the use of MVL, in particular SIXTEEN, for knowledge representation
and reasoning in computer science, linguistics and philosophy is well justified,
there are unfortunately no tools available yet that support automated or interac-
tive reasoning in SIXTEEN. This applies also to most other MVL systems (and
the number of available systems significantly further decreases for quantified
MVLs).
To that end, a semantic embedding of logics based on SIXTEEN within
classical higher-order logic (HOL) is presented. Using this encoding, ordinary
higher-order automated theorem provers can be exploited for reasoning within
the many-valued setting of SIXTEEN. In addition, due to the expressivity of
the host language, automation of meta-logical reasoning (to a certain degree) is
included for free.
The semantic embedding approach provides similar results for other non-
classical logics, yielding out-of-the-box automation of many other logics using
ordinary HOL reasoning systems. Most recent related work has been done in the
context of automation of higher-order quantified modal logic [10, 15], quantified
conditional logics [8], quantified hybrid logics [35] and free logics [12]. There
is empirical evidence that such tools can be employed to successfully verify
or refute non-trivial arguments in e.g. metaphysics and that they even can
contribute new knowledge [14, 13, 7].
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In §2, the above men-
tioned logics based on SIXTEEN are introduced. §3 and §4 address HOL and
its utilization for automating reasoning within MVL. Subsequently, in §5 experi-
ments with the aforementioned encoding are displayed and discussed. Finally, §6
concludes the article and sketches further extensions of the presented approach.
2 Many-Valued Logics Based on SIXTEEN
The MVL systems addressed here are, as outlined earlier, based on a sixteen-
valued structure of truth-degrees. The underlying set V of truth-degrees is given
by the power set of the power set of the classical (bivalent) truth-values {T,F},
i.e. V := 22
{T,F}
. The set V thus further generalizes the set of truth-degrees of
Dunn/Belnap’s system. More precisely, we have
V = 2{N,T,F,B} = {N,N,T,F,B,NT, . . . ,NTFB}
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where N,T,F and B are the respective singleton sets containing N,T,F and
B. The remaining truth-degrees are named using a combination of the let-
ters N,T,F and B, representing the truth-degree that contains the respective
elements when regarded as a set (e.g. NT for the set {N,T}).
Using the above set V , there are multiple, mutually independent, possibilities
on how to order the truth-degrees in a meaningful way. They can, for instance,
be sorted by increasing truth. But there are other reasonable orderings one can
think of, e.g. when interested in the decrease of falsity (which is not the same
thing as increase of truth).
Shramko and Wansing [33, pp. 53–57] suggest three reasonable independent
(partial) orderings, for the set of truth-degrees V .
First, the ordering ≤i orders elements of V by information. Here, a truth-
degree v is smaller than w with respect to its information value, if and only
if v is a subset of w, i.e. v ≤i w :⇔ v ⊆ w. The remaining two orderings
which are more suited for logical reasoning are ≤t and ≤f , comparing truth-
degrees by their truth and falsity, respectively. For a formal definition of these
orderings, the notions of “truthful” and “truthless” subsets of a truth-degree
v are introduced: The truthful subset of v, denoted vt, contains exactly those
elements in v which themselves contain T. The truthless subset of v, denoted
v−t, accordingly consists only of those elements of v which do not contain T.
This notion is analogously extended to (.)f and (.)−f . More formally, we have
vt := {x ∈ v | T ∈ x}
v−t := {x ∈ v | T /∈ x} (1)
and for its counterpart based on falsity
vf := {x ∈ v | F ∈ x}
v−f := {x ∈ v | F /∈ x} (2)
Note that vt 6= v−f and vf 6= v−t, i.e. the two respective counterparts of
these sets do not coincide. As it is pointed out by Shramko and Wansing, the
counterparts of these notions do indeed coincide for the four-valued system of
Dunn/Belnap [33, p.53]. That is why there is a single unique logical ordering in
that system, as opposed to the system described here.
The ordering ≤t can elegantly be defined as an increase in truth and a
non-increase of non-truth. Analogously, ≤f orders by increase of falsity and
non-increase of non-falsity:
v ≤t w :⇔ vt ⊆ wt ∧ w−t ⊆ v−t
v ≤f w :⇔ vf ⊆ wf ∧ w−f ⊆ v−f
(3)
The above orderings ≤i,≤t and ≤f induce a so-called trilattice [34]
SIXTEEN = (V,unionsqi,ui,unionsqt,ut,unionsqf ,uf )
which is essentially a threefold lattice, i.e. having three mutually independent
pairs of meet and join operations.
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Additionally to the above meet and join operations, there are inversion op-
erations, denoted by −, for each axis  ∈ {t, f, i} of the trilattice. These
inversions generalize the notion of conflation [23] to trilattices [34]. As for con-
flation, the key property of a specific inversion operation is that it inverses only
one ordering while not changing the order with respect to the other axes. For
instance, if v ≤t w, then (−t w) ≤t (−t v), but still (−f v) ≤t (−f w) and
(−i v) ≤t (−i w), i.e. ordering by truth is invariant under f -inversion and
i-inversion. More formally, for ,  ∈ {t, f, i},  6= , an operation − is an
inversion with respect to axis  if − has the following properties [33, p. 58]:
v ≤ w ⇒ −w ≤ −v
v ≤ w ⇒ −v ≤ −w
− − v = v
(4)
We are now sufficiently prepared to present the syntax and semantics for the
respective logics based on truth- and falsity-orderings. The three logics studied
in the remainder are denoted as Lt, Lf , and Ltf . Their abstract syntax is given
as:
Lt : A,B ::= x | A ∧t B | A ∨t B | ∼t A
Lf : A,B ::= x | A ∧f B | A ∨f B | ∼f A
Ltf : A,B ::= x | A ∧t B | A ∨t B | ∼t A | A ∧f B | A ∨f B | ∼f A
where x is a propositional variable, and ∧, ∨, and ∼ are the respective connec-
tives for conjunction, disjunction and negation. The primary focus is on Ltf
since the other languages are proper fragments of it.
To provide a semantics for the above languages, let v16 be a 16-valuation,
that is, a map from propositional variables to the sixteen-valued set V . The
semantic evaluation of propositional variables is extended to compound formulae
as usual ( ∈ {t, f}):
v16(A ∧ B) := v(A) u v(B)
v16(A ∨ B) := v(A) unionsq v(B)
v16(∼ A) := −v(A)
(5)
Semantic entailment can now be defined as an increase in truth or as an
decrease in falsity. More formally, for two arbitrary formulas A,B ∈ Ltf , A
entails B wrt. to truth order, A |=16t B, if and only if v16(A) ≤t v16(B) for all 16-
valuations v16. Analogously we have A |=16f B if and only if v16(B) ≤f v16(A),
for all 16-valuations v16. The resulting logics are (Ltf , |=16t ), (Ltf , |=16f ) and the
bi-consequence logic (Ltf , |=16t , |=16f ) [33, p. 65].
3 Classical Higher-Order Logic
Higher-order logic (HOL) is an elegant and expressive formal system that ex-
tends first-order logic with quantification over arbitrary sets and functions.
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Church [21] proposed a version of higher-order logic, called simple type the-
ory (in the following referred to as HOL), which he built on top of the simply
typed λ-calculus [19, 20]. The simply typed λ-calculus augments the untyped
λ-calculus, as studied by Alonzo Church in the 1930s, with simple types. The
set of simple types T is thereby freely generated from a set of base types and a
function type constructor. In HOL, the set of base types is usually taken as (a
superset of) {ι, o} with ι and o being the type of individuals and classical truth
values, respectively.
Syntax of HOL. The terms of the logic are essentially those of the simply
typed λ-calculus, enriched with typed (logical) constants. These constants are
taken from a family of denumerable sets of constant symbols Σ := (Στ )τ∈T ,
called signature. Together with a family of typed variable symbols (Vτ )τ∈T the
terms of HOL are then those terms contained in the smallest set Λ for which
the following conditions hold: Each constant symbol cτ ∈ Στ and each variable
symbol Xτ ∈ Vτ is a HOL term of type τ . If Xτ ∈ Vτ is a variable symbol and
sν ∈ Λ is a HOL term, then the abstraction (of sν) (λXτ . sν)ντ ∈ Λ is a HOL
term of type ντ . Finally, if sτ , tντ ∈ Λ are HOL terms, then the application (of
tντ onto sτ ) given by (tντ sτ )ν ∈ Λ is a HOL term of type ν. Hereby τ, ν ∈ T are
types and the abstraction type ντ denotes the type of functions from arguments
of type τ to values of type ν. Abstraction types are considered left-associative,
i.e. τνµ ≡ (τν)µ. As usual for Church-style typing, a term’s type is given as
subscript and considered a part of its name, hence intrinsic to it. Nevertheless,
type subscripts are omitted in the following if clear from the context.
We choose the signature Σ to consist at least of the primitive logical con-
nectives, that are negation ¬oo, disjunction ∨ooo, and universal quantification
Πτo(oτ) for each type τ ∈ T . The remaining (non-primitive) logical connectives
can be defined as abbreviations in the usual way. By T and F we denote the
HOL symbols for truth and falsehood, respectively. T can e.g. be defined as
T := Πo(λXo. X ∨ ¬X).
We use binder notation ∀Xτ . so as shorthand for universal quantification
given by Πτ(τ→o)→o(λXτ . so). For additional convenience, we allow infix notation
for the common binary logical connectives, i.e. write (s∨ t) instead of ((∨ s) t).
A formula of HOL is a term so ∈ Λ, hence of type o. As usual, a sentence
is a closed formula.
Semantics of HOL. The usual rules of λ-conversions (α-, β-, and η-conversion)
are intrinsically included in HOL. Using these conversions, especially β-reduction,
all quantifier instantiations can be expressed very concisely.
The meta-operation of substituting a variable Xτ by some term tτ in sν is
denoted s[Xτ/tτ ]. Hereby, we assert that there is no variable capture happening
in sτ by assuming α-conversion as implicit when necessary. A β-redex of the
form (λXτ . sν) tτ then β-reduces to sν [Xτ/tτ ]. A term sτ is said to be in
β-normal form if it does not contain any β-redex as a subterm. The β-normal
form of sτ is denoted sτ↓β , equivalence modulo β-conversion (and α-conversion)
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is denoted =β . Reduction, normal forms and equivalence modulo η and βη are
defined analogously. We refer to the literature for a thorough study of typed
λ-calculi [4].
The semantics of HOL is meanwhile well-understood [9] and various seman-
tic generalizations have been studied: We here summarize the most important
points: As a consequence of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem [24], the so-called
standard semantics of HOL is necessarily incomplete. However, it shows that in
many practical applications Henkin’s weaker form of general semantics [28, 2, 1]
is sufficiently expressive. For Henkin’s generalized semantics sound and com-
plete proof calculi exists. And such proof calculi provide the theoretical foun-
dations of modern theorem provers for HOL such as LEO-II [11], Leo-III [36]
and Satallax [18].
Next, standard and Henkin semantics are introduced more formally. We
start out with the notion of frames.
A frame is a collection {Dτ}τ∈T of non-empty sets (called domains), where
Do is the domain of classical truth-values, chosen to be Do = {T, F} (for truth
and falsehood, respectively) and sets Dντ , which denote the domain of functions
of type ντ and range over functions from domain Dτ to co-domain Dν . The
domain of individuals Dι is not further restricted (except for being non-empty).
A HOL model M is a pair M = ({Dτ}τ∈T , I), where {Dτ}τ∈T is a frame
and I is a function that maps each constant symbol cτ ∈ Στ to an element of
Dτ (the denotation of cτ ). It is assumed that I is chosen such that the logical
connectives ¬oo, ∨ooo and Πo(oα) have their usual meaning, e.g. I (¬oo) is the
set-theoretic function that inverts the truth-values of Do:
I (¬oo) = v 7→
{
T if v = F
F if v = T
A variable assignment g is a map that assigns each variable Xτ ∈ Vτ an
element in Dτ . With g[Y/s] we mean the variable assignment that is identical
to g except that variable Y is now mapped to s.
Finally, given a HOL model M = ({Dτ}τ∈T , I) and a variable assignment
g, the value of a HOL term (with respect to M and g), denoted by ‖.‖M,g, is
given by
(i) ‖Xτ‖M,g = g(Xτ ) and ‖cτ‖M,g = I(cτ )
(ii) ‖(sντ tτ )‖M,g = ‖sντ‖M,g ‖tτ‖M,g
(iii) ‖(λXτ . sν)‖M,g is a function f ∈ Dντ s.t. for all z ∈ Dτ it holds that
f(z) = ‖sν‖M,g[Xτ/z]
A HOL model M is called a standard model if and only if the sets Dντ are
chosen to be the complete set DDτν of functions from domain τ to co-domain
ν. The notion of general models (or Henkin models) is, in contrast, defined
by choosing Dντ as a subset of DDτν such that it contains “sufficiently many”,
but not necessarily all, functions. More formally, M is a general model if and
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only if ‖.‖M,g is a total function (that is, every term is assigned a value). The
function ‖.‖M,g is uniquely determined for every general model. Of course, every
standard model is also a general model.
For a model M and a variable assignment g, a formula so is valid in M wrt.
variable assignment g, denoted M, g |=HOL so, if ‖so‖M,g = T . It is called
valid in M if M, g |=HOL so for all variable assignments g. This is written as
M |=HOL so. Finally, a formula so is called Henkin-valid (or simply valid),
written |=HOL so, if so is valid in every Henkin model. In the following, we
always assume general semantics of HOL (i.e. only Henkin models).
4 Embedding of Ltf
This section presents a semantic embedding of the logic Ltf – and thereby
automatically also of Lt and Lf – in HOL. The idea is essentially to exploit
the expressiveness of HOL for encoding the semantics of the given truth-degrees
and the operations on them.
The truth-degrees of SIXTEEN have been introduced as sets of sets of (clas-
sical) truth-values T and F (cf. §2). Note that sets can be elegantly represented
via characteristic functions in HOL and λ-abstraction can be utilized for this
purpose. Exploiting this idea, we below encode all sixteen sets that match the re-
spective truth-degree. More precisely, a set M = {x | P (x)} is modeled in HOL
by its characteristic function χM = λx.P x, which is a predicate that holds for
any element m contained in M and does not hold for any other element m /∈M .
The λ-abstractions of HOL are typed. For example, the characteristic function
for a set of truth values, λxo.P x, has type oo. Consequently, the characteristic
function for a set of sets of truth values has type o(oo). Thus, truth-degrees of
SIXTEEN correspond to functions of type o(oo). A single truth-degree is then
a function λnoo. P n where Po(oo) is an explicit predicate that – via function
application – determines which elements are to be contained within (the set) n
so that n is itself contained in the set (of sets) under consideration. In other
words the sets as characteristic functions approach is applied here in nested
fashion.
The usual set operations are defined as follows (we use the conventional infix
notation):
soτ ∪ toτ := λxτ . (s x) ∨ (t x)
soτ ∩ toτ := λxτ . (s x) ∧ (t x)
where τ ∈ T is some type.
As an example, consider the truth-degree N, which corresponds to the set
{∅}, i.e. the set only containing the empty set of truth values. Note that this
set N contains exactly those sets of truth values that neither contain T nor F;
the empty set of truth values is hence the sole candidate fulfilling this condition.
Consequently, our encoding ofN is λnoo. ¬(n F)∧¬(n T). The list of all sixteen
truth degrees and their respective encoding in HOL is presented at Table 1.
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N = λnoo. F
N = λnoo. ¬(n F) ∧ ¬(n T)
T = λnoo. ¬(n F) ∧ n T
F = λnoo. n F ∧ ¬(n T)
B = λnoo. n F ∧ n T
NF = λnoo. ¬(n T)
NT = λnoo. ¬(n F)
NB = λnoo. (¬(n F) ∧ ¬(n T)) ∨ (n F ∧ n T)
FT = λnoo. (n F ∧ ¬(n T)) ∨ (¬(n F) ∧ n T)
FB = λnoo. n F
TB = λnoo. n T
NFT = λnoo. ¬(n F) ∨ ¬(n T)
NFB = λnoo. n F ∨ ¬(n T)
NTB = λnoo. ¬(n F) ∨ n T
FTB = λnoo. n F ∨ n T
NFTB = λnoo. T
Table 1: Encoding of all truth-degrees of SIXTEEN in HOL.
The appropriateness of the encodings can be shown by verifying that the set-
theoretic denotation of the characteristic function representing the truth-degree
is indeed isomorphic (denoted ') to its interpretation as (set-theoretic) set.
Lemma 4.1. Let dve denote the HOL encoding of truth-degree v ∈ V (as given
in Table 1) and let v ∈ V be a truth-degree. Then, for any HOL model M and
variable assignment g it holds that ‖dve‖M,g ' v.
Proof. Simple application of definitions and the fact that ‖T‖M,g = T and
‖F‖M,g = F for all HOL models M and variable assignments g.
We now present the encoding of the logical operations of Ltf . Recall that
their semantics is defined using the lattice operations unionsq,u and the inversion
operation − as introduced in §2.
Again, the notion of truthful subsets (.)
t
and truthless subsets (.)
−t
(cf. Eq.
(1)) is needed to define the ordering ≤t on truth-degrees:
(v)to(oo) := λnoo. (v n) ∧ (n T) (v)−to(oo) := λnoo. (v n) ∧ ¬(n T)
For any truth degree v, (v)
t
is itself again a set of sets of truth-values, hence
its encoding is similar to that of truth-degrees. Here, the sub-expression (v n)
asserts that n is contained in v, and (n T) ensures that T is contained in n. The
analogous embedding of Eq. (2) is given by
(v)fo(oo) := λnoo. (v n) ∧ (n F) (v)−fo(oo) := λnoo. (v n) ∧ ¬(n F)
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The orderings ≤t and ≤f can then be encoded to match the definition of
Eq. (3) using the same techniques as before:
≤t := λvo(oo).λwo(oo).∀noo.
(
(vt n)⇒ (wt n)) ∧ ((w−t n)⇒ (v−t n))
≤f := λvo(oo).λwo(oo).∀noo.
(
(vf n)⇒ (wf n)) ∧ ((w−f n)⇒ (v−f n))
Lemma 4.2. Let  ∈ {t, f} and let d≤e denote the HOL encoding of ≤.
Then, for v, w ∈ V , it holds that |=HOL (d≤e dve dwe) if and only if v ≤ w.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, we know that dve ' v for any v ∈ V . The remaining
embeddings are well-known set operations of HOL.
The embedding of unionsq,u and − are slightly more complicated as we need a
closed algebraic description for these operators. In the original description, only
an implicit characterization via properties is given for each of these operations.
Up to the authors’ knowledge, there has not been any such closed algebraic
formulation in the literature. As it turns out, the join and meet operations can
be defined as
unionsqt := λvo(oo).λwo(oo).vt ∪ wt ∪
(
w−t ∩ v−t)
ut := λvo(oo).λwo(oo).v−t ∪ w−t ∪
(
wt ∩ vt)
unionsqf := λvo(oo).λwo(oo).vf ∪ wf ∪
(
w−f ∩ v−f)
uf := λvo(oo).λwo(oo).v−f ∪ w−f ∪
(
wf ∩ vf)
The intuition behind these definitions is as follows: Join operations (here for
unionsqt) construct a set that combines the “truthful” elements of the truth-degree
while only containing those “truthless” elements that were contained in both
sets. Note that this is compatible with the ordering idea of ≤t, where bigger
elements increase (.)
t
but do not increase (.)
−t
. A similar argumentation holds
for the meet operations, yielding smaller elements with respect to the respective
ordering.
Lemma 4.3. Let  ∈ {t, f} and dunionsqe denote the HOL encoding of unionsq. Then,
for v, w ∈ V and every HOL model M and variable assignment g, it holds that
‖dunionsqe dve dwe‖M,g ' v unionsq w.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1 and 4.2, we know that dve and d≤e are appropriate
embeddings, for v ∈ V ,  ∈ {t, f}. Since joins are unique, if they exist, it
suffices to show that ‖dunionsqe dve dwe‖M,g is indeed a join of dve and dwe.
Lemma 4.4. Let  ∈ {t, f} and due denote the HOL encoding of u. Then,
for v, w ∈ V and every HOL model M and variable assignment g, it holds that
‖due dve dwe‖M,g ' v u w.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.3
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Finally, the inversion operation −tv can be encoded by explicitly construct-
ing sets (λbo. · · · ) for each element n of the original truth-degree v such that it
contains T whenever n does not contain T, and it contains F if and only if F is
contained in n. That way we only swap the property whether an element of v
contains T, hence inverting it with respect to ≤t:
−t := λvo(oo).λnoo. v
(
λbo.(¬b⇒ n F) ∧ (b⇒ ¬(n T))
)
An analogous construction is employed for −fv, where elements of v containing
F are swapped for elements that do not contain F but still contain T if they
originally did:
−f := λvo(oo).λnoo. v
(
λbo.(¬b⇒ ¬(n F)) ∧ (b⇒ n T)
)
Lemma 4.5. Let  ∈ {t, f} and d−e denote the HOL encoding of −. Then,
for v ∈ V and every HOL model M and variable assignment g, it holds that
‖d−e dve‖M,g ' −v.
Proof. Since both −t and −f are uniquely determined [33, Table 3.1, p. 58], it
suffices to verify each of the sixteen cases for both operations. Simple calculation
confirms that each v ∈ V is mapped to the appropriate inverse −v.
All three entailment relations |=16t , |=16f and |=16tf can be expressed by the
above definitions since they are defined via increase of truth (or decrease of
falsity), i.e. by means of ≤t and ≤f .
Soundness and Completeness Using the afore stated results, we can now
prove soundness and completeness of the embedding of Ltf .
Theorem 4.6. Let Φ,Ψ be Ltf formulas and let dΦe, dΨe be the corresponding
embedded formulas in HOL according to our encoding from above. It holds that
Φ |=16t Ψ iff |=HOL d≤te dΦe dΨe
and
Φ |=16f Ψ iff |=HOL d≤fe dΨe dΦe
Proof. Simple application of the above lemmas.
Corollary 4.7. Let Φ,Ψ be Ltf formulas and let dΦe, dΨe be the corresponding
embedded formulas in HOL according to our encoding from above. It holds that
Φ |=16tf Ψ iff |=HOL
(d≤te dΦe dΨe) ∨ (d≤fe dΨe dΦe)
Theorem 4.6 and Corollary 4.7 now enable us to employ standard HOL rea-
soning systems for reasoning within Ltf (and its sublanguages Lt and Lf ). Since
these systems can access the meta-logical definitions of SIXTEEN operations
during proof search, we also can automatically prove (to some degree) meta-
logical results of these logics. In fact, all of the key properties of ≤,unionsq,u,−
given by Shramko and Wansing in their monograph [33, Chapter 3.5] have been
verified automatically for the presented embedding.
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5 Experiments and Results
To enable experiments and further utilization of the embedding in practice, we
have encoded the above embedding in TPTP THF syntax [37, 38], which is
a concrete syntax format for HOL. An excerpt of this TPTP THF encoding
is given in Fig. 1. Altogether this encoding consists of approx. 150 lines of
code, including comments. It can simply be loaded as axiomatization file by
any TPTP-compatible HOL ATP for reasoning within Ltf . Additionally, we
provided the embedding as a theory for the renowned interactive proof assis-
tant Isabelle/HOL [30]. As a proof of concept for the practical usability of
our automation approach, we formulated several proof tasks within and about
SIXTEEN for ATP systems.
Concerning object-level reasoning within Ltf , we formulated small exem-
plary proof problems. The most interesting problems for this kind of reasoning
might be those which employ a joint ”truth-falsehood framework”, i.e. where
the proof problem contains mixed truth- and falsehood-based operators. As
an example, consider the valid entailment A ∧t B |=t A. If we now, however,
assume entailment by decrease of falsity, neither A nor B can be inferred from
A ∧t B. More formally,
A ∧t B 6|=f A and A ∧t B 6|=f B
Proving the first entailment and disproving the two latter entailments is an
easy task for the employed HOL provers that use our embedding. In fact, also
counter-model finders for HOL, such as Nitpick [17], can be used in order to find
a concrete counter example to the last two invalid entailments. Table 2 shows
the object-level reasoning benchmarks.
Statement Result Time
A ∧t B |=t A Theorem 5ms
A ∧t B |=f A Countersatisfiable 6ms
∼f (A ∧t B) |=t ∼f A Theorem 8ms
∼f∼tA |=t ∼t∼f A Theorem 5ms
A ∧f B |=t A ∨t B Theorem 6ms
A ∧t B |=f A ∨t B Countersatisfiable 7ms
Table 2: Automated verification results of object-level reasoning tasks. The
time results refer to the measurements with Satallax 2.7.
Another interesting suite of experiments aims at verifying the correctness of
our closed formulations and encoding of the lattice operations unionsq,u and −. To
that end, we have checked its definitions against the respective properties given
in the monograph of Shramko and Wansing [33, Prop. 3.2, Def. 3.6]. Table 3
displays the respective properties that have been given to ordinary HOL theorem
provers. The automatically verified meta-logical encodings empirically confirm
that our embedding indeed captures the intended semantics.
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%-- Truth degrees
thf(n_type,type,( n: ($o>$o)>$o )).
thf(n_def,definition,( n=(^[X:$o>$o]:$false) )).
thf(nn_type,type,( nn: ($o>$o)>$o )).
thf(nn_def,definition,( nn = (^[X:$o>$o]:(~(X@$false)&~(X@$true))) )).
...
thf(ftb_type,type,( ftb: ($o>$o)>$o )).
thf(ftb_def,definition,(ftb = (^[X:$o>$o]:((X@$false)|(X@$true))) )).
thf(all_type,type,( all: ($o>$o)>$o )).
thf(all_def,definition,( all = (^[X:$o>$o]:$true) )).
%-- Truthful/Truthless subsets
thf(tpos_subset_type,type,( tpos_subset: ((($o>$o)>$o)>($o>$o)>$o) )).
thf(tpos_subset_def,definition,( tpos_subset =
(^[T:($o>$o)>$o,X:$o>$o]:((T@X)&(X@$true))) )).
thf(tneg_subset_type,type,( tneg_subset: ((($o>$o)>$o)>($o>$o)>$o) )).
thf(tneg_subset_def,definition,( tneg_subset =
(^[T:($o>$o)>$o,X:$o>$o]:((T@X)&~(X@$true))) )).
...
%-- Orderings
thf(ord_t_type,type,( ord_t: ((($o>$o)>$o)>(($o>$o)>$o)>$o) )).
thf(ord_t_def,definition,( ord_t = (^[X:($o>$o)>$o,Y:($o>$o)>$o]:
(![A:$o>$o]: (((tpos_subset@X@A)=>(tpos_subset@Y@A))
&((tneg_subset@Y@A)=>(tneg_subset@X@A))))) )).
...
%-- Lattice operations
thf(inverse_t_type,type,( inverse_t: ((($o>$o)>$o)>($o>$o)>$o) )).
thf(inverse_t_def,definition,( inverse_t = (^[T:($o>$o)>$o,X:$o>$o]:
(T@(^[Y:$o]:((~(Y)=>(X@$false))&(Y=>~(X@$true)))))) )).
thf(join_t_ty,type,( join_t: (($o>$o)>$o)>(($o>$o)>$o)>($o>$o)>$o )).
thf(join_t_def,definition,( join_t = (^[X:($o>$o)>$o,Y:($o>$o)>$o]:
(union@(union@(tpos_subset@X)@(tpos_subset@Y))
@(intersect@(tneg_subset@X)@(tneg_subset@Y)))) )).
thf(meet_t_ty,type,( meet_t: (($o>$o)>$o)>(($o>$o)>$o)>($o>$o)>$o )).
thf(meet_t_def,definition,( meet_t = (^[X:($o>$o)>$o,Y:($o>$o)>$o]:
(union@(union@(tneg_subset@X)@(tneg_subset@Y))
@(intersect@(tpos_subset@X)@(tpos_subset@Y)))) )).
...
Figure 1: THF encoding excerpt. Some truth-degrees and operations are omit-
ted for brevity. Some notes concerning the THF format: The type of truth-
values is written $o, and $o>$o represents the type of (characteristic) functions
from truth-values to truth-values, etc. $true and $false represent truth and
falsity. λ-abstractions and applications are denoted with ^ and @, respectively.
~, |, &, => encode negation, disjunction, conjunction and implication, and !
denotes universal quantification. Comments are lines starting with %.
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For our measurements, the two automated theorem provers LEO-II [11] and
Satallax [18] were used. As it can be seen, all proof tasks were solved successfully,
which provides strong evidence in addition to theoretical results above, for the
soundness (and completeness) of our embedding. In most cases, the desired
properties could be automatically proved in less than 10ms. This provides
further evidence for the practical relevance of our approach.
Source Statement Result Time
Prop 3.2 1. ∀s, t.(T ∈ s ∧T ∈ t)⇔ T ∈ s ut t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(B ∈ s ∧B ∈ t)⇔ B ∈ s ut t Theorem 9ms
∀s, t.(F ∈ s ∨ F ∈ t)⇔ F ∈ s ut t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(N ∈ s ∨N ∈ t)⇔ N ∈ s ut t Theorem 9ms
Prop 3.2 2. ∀s, t.(T ∈ s ∨T ∈ t)⇔ T ∈ s unionsqt t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(B ∈ s ∨B ∈ t)⇔ B ∈ s unionsqt t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(F ∈ s ∧ F ∈ t)⇔ F ∈ s unionsqt t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(N ∈ s ∧N ∈ t)⇔ N ∈ s unionsqt t Theorem 9ms
Prop 3.2 3. ∀s, t.(T ∈ s ∧T ∈ t)⇔ T ∈ s unionsqf t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(N ∈ s ∧N ∈ t)⇔ N ∈ s unionsqf t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(F ∈ s ∨ F ∈ t)⇔ F ∈ s unionsqf t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(B ∈ s ∨B ∈ t)⇔ B ∈ s unionsqf t Theorem 8ms
Prop 3.2 4. ∀s, t.(T ∈ s ∨T ∈ t)⇔ T ∈ s uf t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(N ∈ s ∨N ∈ t)⇔ N ∈ s uf t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(F ∈ s ∧ F ∈ t)⇔ F ∈ s uf t Theorem 8ms
∀s, t.(B ∈ s ∧B ∈ t)⇔ B ∈ s uf t Theorem 8ms
Def 3.6 1. ∀a, b.a ≤t b⇒ −tb ≤t −ta Theorem 421ms
∀a, b.a ≤f b⇒ −ta ≤f −tb Theorem 422ms
∀a, b.a ≤i b⇒ −ta ≤i −tb Theorem 8ms
∀a.−t −ta = a Theorem 15ms
Def 3.6 2. ∀a, b.a ≤t b⇒ −fa ≤t −fb Theorem 419ms
∀a, b.a ≤f b⇒ −fb ≤f −fa Theorem 423ms
∀a, b.a ≤i b⇒ −fa ≤i −fb Theorem 9ms
∀a.−f −fa = a Theorem 17ms
Table 3: Automated verification results of soundness relevant properties from
Shramko and Wansing’s monograph [33]. The time results refer to the measure-
ments with Satallax 2.7.
6 Conclusion
Various techniques to automate reasoning in many-valued logics have been pre-
sented in the literature [26, 3]. The approach presented here, which employs
a semantic embedding in classical higher-order logic, provides a theoretically
and pragmatically appealing alternative. In particular, it is readily applicable
(with off the shelf higher-order reasoners), it enables object-level and meta-level
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reasoning and it supports further logic extensions and combinations.
Various extensions of many-valued logics have been studied in the literature.
Examples include many-valued modal logics or many-valued predicate logics.
Respective extensions of our embedding of SIXTEEN in HOL are analo-
gously feasible. In particular, it should be possible to adapt the embedding
of quantified modal logics [10] and combine it with the work presented here.
Shramko and Wansing [33, pp.216], for example, present an idea to develop first-
order trilattice logics from modal trilattice logics. In this context, a Kripke-style
semantics for quantification is provided in the following form:
M,α |= ∀xA iff for every state β : if αRxβ, then M,β |= A
In previous work [10] we have illustrated that similar clauses (e.g. the modal
box operator) can easily be encoded. Here, the accessibility relation Rx depends
on the individual x, but such a dependency can easily be captured.
Further future work includes the application of the presented automation
technique to more practically motivated examples. We are confident that this
approach can indeed be used to deal with meaningful reasoning tasks where e.g.
linguistic vagueness or uncertainty is involved. Also the meta-level reasoning
capabilities of our approach leave room for much further work. In fact, we
are positive that many meta-level statements and theorems in textbooks and
publications can at least partially be verified (or falsified) with it.
Moreover, it should be possible to provide human-intuitive proof tactics
in proof assistants to support interactive proof development. It was shown in
previous work that similar tactics for modal logic could successfully be employed
in such proof assistants [16]. In combination with proof automation, this should
lead to fruitful employment for computer-aided argumentation and reasoning
within theoretical philosophy.
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